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Abstract  
Fatalities at level crossings continue to be a significant concern for railways around the world. In 
Australia, nearly a third of railway fatalities over the past 15 years have occurred as a result of collisions 
between road and rail vehicles. The number of level crossings in Australia exceeds 23,500 where 8,838 
are on public roads, 5,900 of which have no form of active protection. With relatively low volumes of rail 
and road traffic, the costs for installing traditional protection at a single level crossing significantly 
outweigh the benefits but collectively, these crossings represent a significant proportion of the operating 
risk for railways. In 2014, a group of Australian railways began a national trial of lower-cost level 
crossing warning systems. This 12 month trial involved collecting data on the performance of three 
candidate level crossing warning systems, each installed in shadow-mode at three different sites. The 
warning systems were selected for their ability to use innovative technologies to reduce lifecycle costs. 
The trial has collected performance data under a wide range of operational and environmental 
conditions and provided insight into operational limitations. This paper discusses the issues that were 
encountered during the trial, how they were addressed, considerations for adoption of new technology, 
and concludes with a discussion reflecting on the achievements of this research program. 
1. Introduction 
Level crossings continue to represent a significant safety concern for railway operators in Australia. 
Approximately a third of all rail-related fatalities between 2000 and 2009 occurred as a result of 
collisions between road vehicles and trains at level crossings. During this period there were a total of 
695 collisions that resulted in 97 fatalities (excluding suicides and pedestrian fatalities) [1]. Due to the 
large expanse of land traversed by Australian railways (41,500km in 2003), there are in excess of 
23,500 level crossings of which approximately 21% have active protection (flashing lights, boom 
barriers) and 8,838 interface with public roads [2]. While the risk at low-exposure level crossings with 
passive controls may not be significant, collectively they contribute to a substantial proportion of 
operating risk. Approximately 45% of collisions occurred at level crossings with passive controls 
between 2000 and 2009 [1], the majority occurring at public level crossings. The cost of upgrading 
public level crossings with passive controls (approximately 5,900) based on a 2012 lifecycle costing 
estimate of current type-approved level crossing technology, would exceed AU$3.25 Billion. 
Safety requirements for traditional level crossing warning devices installed at high-exposure urban level 
crossings had often been considered excessive for low-exposure crossings. There was a commonly 
2 
 
held view that applying these safety requirements to low-exposure crossings would cause a distortion in 
safety spending, resulting in the upgrade of fewer passive level crossings. A significant proportion of the 
cost of level crossing warning devices is influenced by safety integrity requirements; higher levels of 
safety integrity require more demanding development processes than lower levels and this is very much 
reflected in the relative development costs. 
The Australian industry has been investigating low-cost level crossings for more than 20 years. In 1989, 
the Victorian coroner, G. Johnstone, recommended the urgent consideration and implementation of low-
cost alternatives for protecting level crossings [3]. Since then, the rail industry has struggled to move 
forward on the adoption of such alternatives, confronted by technical and legal obstacles (issues related 
development of an argument that would satisfy legal duty under the national rail safety legislation). A 
national approach was needed to progress such work (both technically and legally) and the CRC for 
Rail Innovation, at the request of rail industry, coordinated a low-cost level crossing national trial 
program addressing both the trialling of candidate systems and development of an argument for 
adoption.  
The purpose of the trial was to obtain nationally consistent operational data on lower cost alternative 
technologies for 12 months. Data collected from the trial could potentially be used as safety qualification 
evidence should any of the trial systems be considered for adoption by participating railways. Safety 
qualification tests are important in providing evidence that the candidate systems function as intended 
under operational conditions.  
2. Trial design 
Lower cost level crossing warning devices 
Candidate level crossing warning devices were selected with comprehensive set of criteria including: 
conformance to level crossing warning device requirements and standards; product performance, track 
record, approvals and use in other railways; supplier track record (quality and safety management 
system accreditations); lifecycle costs; Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety – evidence of 
RAMS (including safety case with evidence of functional and technical safety); product design including 
anti-vandalism and ergonomics (human factors design); and product documentation including design, 
drawings, approvals (e.g. Electromagnetic Compatibility), factory acceptance testing, maintenance and 
service schedules, product training and competency assessment. 
All trialled devices were solar powered. Mains power was not provided to candidate systems during the 
trial. The connectivity between the different components of the systems was ensured by either cables 
clipped to the rail or vital wireless communications. The candidate systems used electronic treadles 
based on wheel sensors or axle counting sections for train detection or track occupancy function.  
Trial sites 
Three single-track level crossings sites with an existing active warning that operates using track circuits 
were selected for the trial. Track circuits were required in order to ensure a reliable and predictable 
source of baseline data for comparison. 3G mobile communications coverage was also required to 
support remote data logging. The sites were chosen in order to expose candidate systems to a wide 
range of rolling stock, speeds and operating conditions (train traffic, rail gauge, electrical traction, 
environmental conditions, etc.). The trial sites were selected in three Australian states (Queensland, 
New South Wales and Victoria). 
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Data collection methodology 
As the level crossing warning systems being trialled were not fully assured, appropriate precautions 
were taken in order to minimise risk. Shadow-mode testing was utilised and involved testing the level 
crossing warning systems without the road user interface parallel to an operational type-approved level 
crossing warning device. This testing methodology allowed candidate systems to be trialled in the 
operating conditions of a live level crossing without affecting the safety of road users or the railway. A 
comparative logging system captured the operating performance of the trial systems compared with the 
existing baseline system. In order to test the level crossing warning system power supply system under 
load conditions equivalent to a full installation (i.e. where the power consumption includes driving RX5 
flashing flights and bells), suppliers were required to simulate the power demand using resistive loads 
equivalent to the RX5 lamps and bells. 
Level crossing loggers were comprised of a Brodersen RTU8 data logger and a GSM modem, installed 
at each trial site and interfaced to the baseline and supplier systems with appropriate isolation (e.g. 
surge protection, opto-isolated relay couplers, etc.). The state of digital I/O ports was logged with a 
timestamp for each event condition, which was triggered by rising-edge and falling-edge detection for 
each of the digital I/O ports. The log entries were recorded to a ring buffer that could be accessed 
remotely using MODBUS RT over IP protocol with the Brodersen IO Tools software. The comparative 
logging capability allowed the following parameters and conditions to be monitored: warning time (time 
from when the train is detected to when it enters the island circuit), warning deactivation time (time from 
when the train passes the clearance point to when the warning is deactivated), right side failures and 
wrong side failures. To determine the causes of an anomaly identified by the comparative logging, logs 
from the trial systems’ diagnostic and monitoring function were used to identify causes.  
Trial evaluation criteria 
The data analysis involved sequencing state changes of the baseline warning system and comparing 
performance of the trial systems with the baseline system. This analysis resulted in the following 
classification of events: 
• Accurate detections: detections where state changes observed by the baseline system were 
also observed by the trial systems without significant variation.  
• Late deactivations: tail ringing conditions, where the warning continued after the train left the 
level crossing island for more than 10 seconds.  
• Right side failures: failures that result in the system entering a fail-safe state (i.e. warning is 
provided to road user): 
• Wrong side failures: dangerous failures that can lead to hazards, such as when the approach 
warning is not provided, or not continuously provided, or when a fault is detected by the system 
but does not result in the activation of the warning. 
Each anomalous event was investigated to understand its potential causes. Other data sources 
including logs from the trial systems and train movement records were used to confirm train movements 
(including track maintenance vehicles) and determine the types of rolling stock, etc. 
3. Lessons learnt 
Level crossings used as a launch point for hi-rail vehicles 
The large majority of the observed anomalous events (e.g. axle miscounts, incorrect interpretation of 
train movements) were caused by the use of the level crossing as an entry point for hi-rail vehicles or 
due to the passage of track maintenance vehicles in convoy. For example, axle miscounts occurred as 
a result of hi-rail vehicles entering the island axle counting section via the road interface.  
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Interpretation of anomalous events was complicated by the fact that hi-rail vehicles do not shunt the 
track circuits. In the case a hi-rail vehicle launches onto the track or traverses the level crossing, the 
baseline system only records the activation of the flashing lights from the use of the level crossing 
maintenance switch. It does not record any track occupancies for the approach or island track circuits. It 
was not always possible to ascertain the cause of anomalous events involving hi-rail vehicles, especially 
for instances where the flashers had not been activated via the maintenance switch.  
Additional mechanisms to mitigate anomalies resulting from the launching of hi-rail vehicles via the road 
interface need to be considered. Examples include: a remote mechanism allowing hi-rail vehicles to 
reset the warning device; use of an island track circuit to alleviate miscounts caused by hi-rail vehicles. 
Reset mechanism after right-side failures 
For trial systems based on axle counting sections, a miscount event would cause the warning system to 
enter a fail-safe state (activation of the RX5 flashing lights). The axle counting section would be reset 
following the error-free traversal of subsequent trains, returning the warning system to a nominal state. 
This system behaviour became problematic at level crossing sites with low rail traffic volumes. For 
volumes lower than a train a day, the batteries would become completely discharged (due to solar yield 
and limited battery capacity) in the case of a miscount (i.e. a right-side failure), resulting in a wrong-side 
failure once the warning failed to operate. Right-side failures, while technically safe, are known to be 
associated with increases in risk-taking behaviour – especially where road users are exposed frequently 
or for prolonged periods. For level crossings with low train traffic, a reset mechanism based on the 
error-free traversal of subsequent trains would result in unacceptably long exposure of road users to 
right-side failure. This highlights the importance of the level crossing being reached by maintenance 
crews within the limited operational time of the solar-powered batteries under continuous flashing, 
and/or a remote reset mechanism. 
Use of single treadles for the island circuit 
The trial has demonstrated that the use of electronic treadles in certain circumstances (low speeds, 
stopping) can cause the level crossing to misinterpret the train movement, potentially resulting in safety 
critical events.  If application conditions can be assumed for a given level crossing site (e.g. that trains 
are not permitted to stop on approaches or on the level crossing and must maintain a minimum speed), 
then such train detection mechanisms could be considered. Many of the issues observed during the trial 
were caused by the use of a single treadle at the level crossing island. The installation of two treadles 
would have addressed misinterpreted train movements related to the entry of hi-rail vehicles at the 
crossing island.  
Wireless communications 
On several occasions, RF interference caused one of the trial systems to enter a fail-safe state due to 
excessive wireless communication errors. In cases where the warning system remained in a fail-safe 
state for a prolonged period of time, the batteries would often drain resulting in a wrong-side failure. This 
was due to the inability of the trial participant organisations to intervene within 48 hours of the failure. 
Two of the trial systems used ISM (industrial, scientific and medical) radio spectrum for wireless 
communications. While it was known that both suppliers were using an ISM band, it was assumed that 
both systems would have been sufficiently robust through the use of spread spectrum techniques (e.g. 
frequency hopping spread spectrum) and coding. Wireless communication using ISM frequencies 
(which were without regulatory protection and permit unlicensed use) can be subject to increased levels 
of interference. Use of dedicated radio spectrum was expected to decrease risk of interference from 
other equipment on ISM frequencies and therefore increase availability of wireless communications. 
Optimisation of wireless radio configuration and installation of repeaters improved robustness. 
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4. Process for adopting new level crossing technologies 
Australian context and proposed approach 
This level crossing trial was one of several industry-led level crossing research projects investigating the 
adoption of level crossing warning devices based on new or alternative technologies. The initial 
objective was to propose lower-cost warning devices considering a population-treatment approach to 
improving safety. This would theoretically provide significant safety benefits over the network by trading 
reduced safety requirements for cost. It was envisaged that this could be tolerated for low-exposure 
level crossings in regional areas, where the reduction of cost would have allowed a significant number 
of additional level crossing upgrades for the same upgrade budget.The approach was not supported by 
the regulator due to difficulties in formulating an argument based on quantitative safety targets using 
statistics that were not considered reliable. Engagement with the regulator was a key aspect of 
developing an argument for adoption to minimise the chance of surprises when support for the 
argument would be sought.  
An alternative approach was necessary and included the development of a preliminary hazard and risk 
estimation process for the introduction of new level crossing technologies [4], a process that can be 
used by railway infrastructure managers at an early stage of a level crossing upgrade project to 
determine the applicability of a proposed solution(s) at a specific level crossing site. The process 
involves comparing a proposed level crossing warning system with a reference system (existing type-
approved equipment) and evaluating the impact on safety. It is assumed that the reference system is 
based on current good practice and already satisfies the so-far-as-is-reasonably-practicable (SFAIRP) 
requirement for reduction of risk at a given site.  
Preliminary acceptability of a proposed system is determined by a comparison of individual risk of 
fatality (IRF) of the proposed and reference systems and whether risk acceptance criteria are met. In 
cases where the IRF of a proposed system is less than or equivalent to the reference system, a SFAIRP 
argument could be developed on the basis that the cost of other options and further risk reduction are 
grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit. In cases where the IRF of the proposed system is greater 
than the reference system, further analysis would be required to determine applicability, including 
demonstration that a proposed system would reduce risk to a level that meets the risk acceptance 
criteria for the specific site; that the cost of other options to reduce risk is grossly disproportionate to the 
safety benefit; and that the cost of further risk reduction in the proposed system to at least meet the IRF 
of the reference system is grossly disproportionate to the safety benefit.  
In some circumstances, there may be a compelling case for the installation of a warning system with a 
higher IRF at a low-exposure site (e.g. occupational and farm crossings) given that the cost of installing 
a system with an equivalent or better IRF may be excessive. The IRF of the proposed system must 
meet the risk acceptance criteria defined in the railway’s safety management system, providing 
evidence that the risk is tolerable. If this risk is not tolerable, then the proposed system is not suitable. It 
should be emphasized that the proposed process does not in any way undermine or short-cut existing 
regulatory processes. Level crossing risk continues to be owned by the railway infrastructure managers 
and is their responsibility. The process is expected to give rail safety regulators confidence that a 
rigorous process was adopted to support the safe application of new technologies at level crossings. 
Human factors aspects of technology adoption 
The target environment for deployment of lower cost warning devices includes regional areas where 
maintenance and timely restoration can be significant challenges, potentially resulting in a system 
remaining in a failure state for prolonged periods of time. Right-side failures are an example of an 
environmental context that can lead to risk taking by road users at railway level crossings.  Road users' 
expectations of the railway crossing environment can be influenced by the type of right-side failure both 
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at a particular crossing as well as on the complete road network, highlighting the need to consider 
repetitive right-side failures at level crossings as an important road safety issue. 
The perception of reliability of level crossing warning devices has been demonstrated to affect road user 
warning compliance [5, 6]. Frequent or prolonged right-side failures may further influence driver 
performance, causing road users to lose confidence in the warning. This potentially facilitates the 
creation of mental models of when the train approach warning is credible based on other factors such 
as known train schedules, resulting in a mismatch between real risk and perceived risk. Such biases 
can result in a transference effect, where performance at other level crossings in the network may also 
be affected. Therefore, understanding the human factors aspects of frequent and prolonged right-side 
failure is important in determining appropriate system performance targets for new warning devices.  
Tail ringing conditions are another type of right-side failures that need to be considered with lower cost 
devices. Tail ringing is a type of right-side failure, where the warning device correctly detects the 
approaching train, but does not detect that the train has cleared the island. Frequent and prolonged 
delays in clearing the warning may result in road users assuming it is safe to traverse after the train has 
cleared the crossing, even though the warning is still active [6]. While the target context for lower cost 
warning devices is only expected to include single-track lines, by not clearing the warning promptly after 
the train has cleared the island, a dangerous condition is created on multi-track lines when the extended 
warning is due to a second train.   
5. Conclusion 
The majority of issues found during this trial of lower cost level crossing technologies were caused by 
the entry and traversal of hi-rail vehicles and the traversal of maintenance vehicles in convoy. This trial 
has demonstrated that careful consideration is required when a level crossing is used as a launching 
point for hi-rail vehicles. Lower-cost systems are likely to be applicable for only simple level crossing 
designs. For systems based on axle counting sections, the reset mechanism should be carefully 
considered. A reset mechanism based on correct traversal of successive trains must consider train 
traffic volumes. A remote reset facility may need to be considered for low train traffic volumes. For 
systems based on electronic treadles, rules need to be considered to ensure that trains do not stop on 
the level crossing or approach sections and that the level crossing is approached, traversed and that the 
strike-in treadle for the opposite travelling direction is cleared by the train at a minimum speed. The 
proposed preliminary hazard and risk analysis process can be used to determine the applicability of a 
proposed solution for a specific level crossing site and set of application conditions. While the trialled 
systems may not be as safe as the reference system for all conditions, could be suitable and may result 
in significant cost reductions and increased reliability compared with traditional level crossing warning 
systems based on track circuits. This is particularly the case for level crossings with low train traffic 
volumes and seasonal lines, where reliability of track circuits can be an issue. 
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